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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 56 FALL 1981 NUMBER 1
ON JUDGMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS IN
ANTITRUST LITIGATION: WHEN
SHOULD DAMAGES BE TREBLED?
KENT S. BERNARD*
Under the federal antitrust laws, private parties are author-
ized to institute suits to recover treble damages for any injury to
business or property caused by an antitrust violation.' Since labil-
* Trade Regulation Counsel, Pfizer Inc.; Member of the Pennsylvania Bar; B.A., Col-
gate University, 1972, J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1975. The views expressed in this
Article are those of the author and do not purport to represent those of any other person or
entity.
1 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Act of Sept. 12,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1156 (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat.
731 (1914)).
Section 4 is the successor to section 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210
(1890) and to § 77 of the Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 77, 28 Stat. 570 (1894), which pro-
vided treble damages for the violation of any of its provisions. Initially, in presenting his
draft of the antitrust bill, Senator Sherman proposed a provision for double damages. S.
3445, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 CONG. REC. 7513 (1888). Senator Sherman's draft then was
presented to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary which substantially rewrote and re-
vised the proposal. See W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 94 (1965). Sec-
tion 7, which authorizes private persons to sue antitrust violators for treble damages, actu-
ally was drafted by Senator George Frisbie Hoar, who apparently based the provision upon
section 4 of the English Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. I., c. 3, § 4. See K. ELZINGA &
W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 64 (1976); E. KIN Er,
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 257-58,
277 (1978); W. LETWIN, supra, at 94 & n.9 (citing Senate Committee on the Judiciary Min-
ute Book 227-33 (March 31, 1890)). There is no record or indication of the Senate Commit-
tee's deliberations concerning the size of the damage multiple beyond Senator Hoar's dissat-
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ity is joint and several, the treble recovery may be obtained from
any one defendant even if multiple parties are responsible for the
damages.2 The possible inequity of this result has engendered criti-
cal debate over whether defendants subject to liability for treble
damages should be entitled to seek contribution from coconspira-
tors in the unlawful activity.3 Recently, the Supreme Court re-
solved this issue holding that existing law does not afford defen-
dants the right to such contribution.4
isfaction with double damages. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra, at 64.
Since the passage of the Sherman Act, there has been sporadic criticism and movement
to reduce or abolish the mandatory triple damage award. See note 8 infra.
2 Although the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), are silent regarding the nature of liability among antitrust
coconspirators, subsequent litigation has established that those who act in concert to violate
the antitrust laws are jointly and severally liable. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 617 F.2d 1248, 1257 (7th Cir. 1980); Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d
389, 393 (5th Cir. 1976); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Cal.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 842 (1968). A successful plaintiff, therefore, may look to any defendant for full
satisfaction of his damage award. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d at 1257; see
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1978); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 314-15 (4th ed. 1971).
3 The body of literature concerning contribution is sizeable. See, e.g., Easterbrook,
Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Anal-
ysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331 (1980); Sellers, Contribution in Antitrust Damage Actions, 24
VILL. L. REV. 829 (1979); Sullivan, New Perspectives in Antitrust Litigation: Towards a
Right of Comparative Contribution, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 389 (1980); Note, Contribution in
Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 6 J. CORP. L. 141 (1980); Note, Contribution and Anti-
trust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890 (1980).
For an overview of the positions on the topic, see Symposium, Contribution Among
Defendants-Availability and Impact in Antitrust Cases, 48 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 1583
(1979). For a comparison between the antitrust contribution issue and the trend favoring
contribution in the areas of tort, admiralty, and securities law, see Sullivan, supra, at 392-
401.
, Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2070 (1981). In Texas
Industries the plaintiff, a purchaser of concrete, sued a manufacturer and seller of ready-
mix cement, alleging that the manufacturer had conspired to fix prices in the New Orleans
area in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 101 S. Ct. at 2062.
The sole-named defendant, along with others, had been indicted criminally for a price-fixing
violation. Each criminal defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere in the criminal pro-
ceedings. Id. at 2063 n.4. Through discovery, the defendant manufacturer learned the iden-
tity of the codefendants in the criminal proceeding. The defendant sought to join those
parties as third-party defendants in the civil suit, claiming contribution. Id. at 2063. The
Fifth Circuit found no compelling reason "to create such a right as a matter of federal com-
mon law." Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th
Cir. 1979).
The Texas Industries Court turned to what it termed "a very significant and perhaps
dispositive threshold question," namely, whether the federal courts possessed the authority
to create the right of contribution under the antitrust laws without legislation. 101 S. Ct. at
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Lost in the debate over contribution, however, is the antece-
dent question of what are the damages to be trebled when a partial
settlement has been reached before the verdict. Although contribu-
tion focuses on the allocation of liability among coconspirators,5 it
does not address the initial calculation of treble damages when a
coconspirator settles prior to judgment. This question is distinct
from the question of contribution.' Existing case law holds that
2065-66. There being no "uniquely federal interests" at stake and no suggestion that Con-
gress intended to bestow the power to alter the statutory remedies that it provided, the
Court concluded that the federal courts lacked the "broad power" to formulate a right of
contribution. Id. at 2070. The net effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Indus-
tries is to place the burden upon Congress to create a right of contribution or upon the
courts to re-examine the methods for adjusting damages when there are pre-trial
settlements.
For a synopsis of the myriad forms of contribution proposals and court decisions lead-
ing up to the Texas Industries decision, see Ponsoldt & Terry, Contribution in Civil Anti-
trust Litigation: The Emerging Consensus in Legal Literature, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 315
(1981).
" The contribution question involves the distribution of liability for damages among
multiple defendants. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 50, at 310. Recently, much attention
has been focused on the methods that would be used to allocate liability among joint anti-
trust violators if contribution were permitted. The threshold issue is whether the allocation
should be made upon the basis of fault, or upon a pro-rata division of damages among the
coconspirators, or according to the relative sales or purchases of each violator. See Ponsoldt
& Terry, supra note 4, at 334. If the damages are to be allocated according to relative culpa-
bility, fault distribution mechanisms must be developed. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 415
& n.131.
The contribution bill introduced by Senator Bayh, S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. 17325 (1979); see notes 50-53 and accompanying text infra, proposed to allocate
liability based on a "comparative benefits" approach-a distribution of damages according
to the amount of purchase or sales attributable to the antitrust violation. See note 49 infra.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Industries, the Eighth Circuit permitted
contribution on a pro-rata basis. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Sup-
ply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4, 1186 (8th Cir. 1979).
Each method presents its own difficulties. Indeed, one commentator has suggested al-
ternative solutions based on the nature of the suit. See Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis
of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 42, 46-62 (1980). If contribution were permitted in antitrust suits for price-fixing viola-
tions, for example, treble damages or claim reduction should be apportioned on the basis of
market shares. Id. at 59-60. If contribution were allowed, however, in cases such as Profes-
sional Beauty Supply, where a dealer of cosmetic products alleged a conspiracy by a com-
petitor and a manufacturer of beauty supplies to terminate its dealership, the allocation
should be on a pro-rata basis, given the obvious problems for a court in allocating the rela-
tive culpability of each defendant. Id. at 60 n.39.
The complexity of the allocation issue appears to have been a factor in the Supreme
Court's decision in Texas Industries. See 101 S. Ct. at 2065. Rather than endorsing a partic-
ular method of contribution, this Article attempts to demonstrate how a current inequity in
antitrust may be corrected without reaching the complex issues addressed by the contribu-
tion proposals.
I See note 5 and accompanying text supra. While the issue of contribution is distinct
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damages are to be trebled before deducting the amount of the set-
tlement.7 This Article explores the bases and implications of that
rule, concluding that it can and should be changed to require that
damages be trebled after deducting the settlement amount.8 Such
conceptually from the calculation of treble damages where there has been a settlement, any
plan for contribution initially must determine the relative rights between the parties. First,
may a defendant who litigates and loses recover contribution from a settling defendant?
Second, may the settlor who has paid more than his share obtain contribution from a non-
settling defendant? Third, how will a settlement by one defendant affect the liability of the
remaining defendants? Fourth, will the liability of the litigating parties be lessened if the
settlor has paid more than his apportioned share? Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribu-
tion Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 331,
334 n.11 (1980). This Article will focus on the liability of the remaining antitrust defendants
once one or more have settled with the plaintiff prior to judgment.
7 See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957). One commentator specifically has recognized the confusion between the distinct is-
sue of contribution and the settlement rule established in Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, re-
marking that the Flintkote doctrine was "subsumed within the contribution doctrine but
[it] had not been the subject of any direct comment." Salzman, The Effect of Contribution
of Litigation and Settlement: The Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 1593,
1594 (1979). Concerned over the possible elimination of the present Flintkote windfall bene-
fit to plaintiffs, he noted that one reason for the reaction against contribution proposals is
that the "plaintiffs fear that people will wake up and start arguing against the Flintkote Co.
v. Lysfjord doctrine, which has been quietly accepted-at least since 1957." Id.
8 This Article assumes the continued existence of mandatory treble damages. On a pol-
icy level, however, there is a real question whether the treble-damage rule should be limited
or abolished entirely. See Bernard, The Actions of the Antitrust Plaintiff: Law, Policy and
a Modest Proposal, 16 DUQ. L. REv. 307, 329 n.85 (1977-78).
As early as 1898, Congressman William Greene, a Nebraskan populist, proposed reduc-
ing antitrust awards to double damages, while in 1908 Congressman William Hepburn pro-
posed the elimination of any multiple award. K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, supra note 1, at 64-
65. During the 1950's several legislative proposals were introduced which would have per-
mitted the courts to reduce treble damage awards at their discretion. Id. at 65. A similar
view was espoused by a committee established by former Attorney General Herbert Brown-
ell, Jr. See THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 379 (1955). The committee ob-
served that the "burgeoning of treble damages recoveries" required a re-examination of the
mandatory treble damage award. Id. at 378. Believing that "the development of both the
procedural and substantive law, largely favorable to the plaintiff, plus the award of attorney
fees, affords sufficient incentive to [bring] private antitrust actions," the committee con-
cluded that a proposal giving a trial judge the discretion to impose double or triple damages
would not curtail this incentive. Id. at 379. To require mandatory trebling where the defen-
dant was an inadvertent or unwitting violator would go beyond mere compensation without
serving any deterrent purpose. Id.
In addition to not serving any deterrent or enforcement purpose, Professors Elzinga and
Breit have argued that the treble damage award also may encourage several "economic inef-
ficiencies." See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 81-96. The injured party, for exam-
ple, has no incentive to eliminate or minimize his damages because the expected reparations
exceed the possible damages. Id. at 84. Furthermore, a plaintiff may institute a "nuisance"
suit in the hope of capitalizing on a defendant's fear of treble damages and obtaining a
settlement. Id. at 90-91. Finally, a great amount of time and resources are required to deter-
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a change would alleviate many of the allegations of unfairness
which prompted the contribution debate and, unlike contribution,
would not require legislative implementation. Moreover, the pro-
posed change would achieve a satisfactory balance between the
need to encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws, which
is fostered by the treble damage provision,9 and the need to use
our judicial resources efficiently, which is reflected in the common-
law tradition favoring settlements.1 0
AN OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM
Since antitrust defendants are jointly and severally liable,
each coconspirator may be held liable for the entire amount of any
judgment. 1 Consequently, should one or more defendants settle
mine and allocate the damages involved since treble damages induce complicated litigation.
Id. at 95. For these reasons, an award of treble damages is an economically inefficient
method of enforcing the antitrust laws. Id. at 96. See generally Parker, The Deterrent Ef-
fect of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M.L. REv. 286 (1973).
The civil liability provision of the federal antitrust laws was designed to compensate
injured plaintiffs and to deter violations by encouraging the institution of private suits. See
E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 301 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 907 (1976). See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (primary
purpose behind treble damages provision is to encourage plaintiffs to act as private attor-
neys general).
10 The number of antitrust actions commenced in the district courts has been increas-
ing steadily. See ADwNIsmTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 61 (1980). Public policy, however, continues to favor the settlement of dis-
putes. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1184 (8th Cir. 1979); Lynn v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 453 F. Supp. 599, 603 (E.D.
Tex. 1978); Gross v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 396 F. Supp. 373, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Walther & Cie v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 397 F. Supp. 937, 946 (M.D. Pa. 1975); S.E.
Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 881 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Traynor, Law-
suits: First Resort or Last?, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 635, 640; Note, An Analysis of Settlement,
22 STAN. L. REv. 67, 88 (1969).
, See note 2 supra. Contribution permits a tortfeasor against whom a judgment has
been rendered "to recover proportional shares of the judgment 'from other joint tortfeasors
whose negligence contributed to the injury and who are liable to the plaintiff."' Zapico v.
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Dawson v. Contractors Transp.
Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
Historically, joint tortfeasors were denied a right of contribution. The common-law rule
originated with Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337, 1337 (K.B. 1799), which pro-
hibited contribution cases involving an intentional tort. Disregarding the distinction be-
tween intentional and unintentional wrongs, the early American courts generally relied upon
Merryweather to deny a right of contribution. See, e.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago
B. & Q. Ry., 196 U.S. 217, 224 (1905). Thus, the absolute rule against contribution became
firmly entrenched in American law. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 393; see W. PROSSER, supra
note 2, § 50, at 305. See generally Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
81 U. PA. L. REv. 130. 130-46 (1932).
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with the plaintiff prior to the rendition of a verdict, the remaining
defendants would then be liable for the total judgment, less any
credit for the settlement.12 Assume, for example, that a plaintiff
sues three defendants for an aggregate of $100,000. During the
course of the trial, he settles with two of the defendants for a com-
bined sum of $75,000 and then obtains a verdict of $100,000
against the remaining defendant. Either of the following methods
then could be used to calculate liability of the nonsettling
defendant.
Under alternative one, the court would treble the $100,000
verdict, thereby arriving at initial damages in the amount of
$300,000. It then would deduct the $75,000 settlement, leaving the
nonsettling defendant liable for the remaining $225,000. The net
recovery to the plaintiff would be $300,000. Method two, however,
would require the court to deduct the $75,000 settlement from the
$100,000 verdict. It then would treble the remaining amount, re-
sulting in the nonsettling defendant being liable for $75,000. The
net recovery for the plaintiff would be $150,000.
Alternative one represents the current law.13 It serves as a
Concern over the ability of a plaintiff to choose the person who would bear the entire
liability and the possibility that a party might escape liability completely resulted in a gen-
eral abrogation of the no-contribution rule. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 875 (Deering
1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925(1) (1980); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1401 (McKinney
1976). An overwhelming majority of states now permit contribution among joint tortfeasors.
See S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 12-13, reprinted in [1979] 942 ANTTRrusT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Special Supp. 5 (Dec. 6, 1979).
In contrast to the reception accorded the right of contribution, courts have reacted
more favorably to the principle of indemnity. Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d at 718.
Indemnity permits a party against whom a judgment has been rendered to shift his entire
liability to another party, who, either by virtue of their relationship or by an express agree-
ment between them, should bear the loss. Id. at 718-19. The courts also permitted indem-
nity of a "passive" tortfeasor by an "active" tortfeasor, thereby placing the burden of the
loss on the more guilty party. Wallenius Bremen v. United States, 409 F.2d 994, 998 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Chicago Great Western Ry. v. Casura, 234 F.2d
441, 449 (8th Cir. 1956); Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 915 (1951). Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit held that indemnification may not be
allowed among antitrust coconspirators, reasoning that: "a person who violates the antitrust
statutes should not be entitled to full indemnification from the more culpable third party."
Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186.
"2 See note 11 supra. The law purports to disallow double recovery. See RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 885(3) (1979). Thus, if a plaintiff recovers an item of damage from one
coconspirator by settlement, he cannot recover the same item from another coconspirator at
trial. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971); Baughman v.
Cooper-Jarrett Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 533 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
'3 See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957); note 23 and accompanying text infra.
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strong incentive for defendants to settle. In the case of a small
company which believes that it has a meritorious defense or which
is a minor participant in the conduct at issue, settlement may be
mandatory if it cannot afford to risk incurring treble damage liabil-
ity based on the entire initial judgment.14 Furthermore, the first
method of calculation effectively encourages plaintiffs to proceed
to trial against at least one defendant by providing them with a net
recovery after trial which theoretically would be greater than any
amount which they otherwise could have obtained by settling with
all of the defendants. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, the cur-
rent law encourages partial settlements while discouraging total
ones.
Alternative two also retains the incentive for defendants to
settle because a nonsettling defendant remains potentially liable
for triple the damages remaining once the settlement has been de-
ducted in addition to his liability for the plaintiff's attorney's fees.
The second option, however, would ease the heavy pressure on a
small defendant to settle for more than its fair share of liability.15
It also drastically weakens the existing incentive for a plaintiff to
refuse a full settlement offer and go to trial against one of the de-
fendants. Since the antitrust laws were not intended to discourage
settlements, this result presents a strong argument in favor of
adopting the second option. The plaintiff still would be protected,
however, since he would receive full damages in any event. Should
the case progress to trial, the plaintiff would receive the benefit of
the trebling provision plus his attorney's fees. Moreover, while the
nonsettling defendant is the one at whose expense the damages are
trebled, at least, under this option, the punishment bears a closer
relationship to the magnitude of the harm caused by him.
THE GENESIS OF CURRENT LAW-FLINTKOTE Co. v. LYSFJORD
In 1957, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Flintkote Co.
14 S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1979); Note, Contribution Among Antitrust
Violators, 29 CATH. U.L. Rav. 669, 681 (1980); see Sullivan, supra note 3, at 416. But see
Note, Contribution For Antitrust Codefendants, 66 VA. L. Rv. 797, 814-15 (1980). When
the amount of the settlement is deducted from the final treble damages assessed, the non-
settling defendants, in effect, are held liable for the settling defendants illegal activities. See
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 12 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Thus, the settlement "forced"
on a small company may be comparatively larger than that negotiated with a larger organi-
zation. See Contribution Among Antitrust Violators, supra, at 681. But see Easterbrook,
Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 343-44.
11 See note 14 supra.
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v. Lysfjord,16 prescribed the current method of adjusting judg-
ments to reflect prior settlements. Flintkote involved an action for
damages against a tile supplier who allegedly had joined an ex-
isting conspiracy among tile contractors to restrain trade in acous-
tical tile. After the commencement of the action, but prior to the
trial, the plaintiffs executed a covenant not to sue with certain
named coconspirators other than Flintkote.17 Pursuant to the
terms of the agreement, the plaintiffs discontinued their action
against the cocovenantees in exchange for the sum of $20,000, but
expressly reserved all of their rights against Flintkote. The case
proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, set-
ting the actual damages at $50,000.
The Flintkote court was confronted with the issue whether the
$20,000 settlement should be subtracted from the actual damages
of $50,000 before they were trebled or whether the damages award
should be trebled before deducting the $20,000 settlement. The
first method would yield a $90,000 judgment, whereas the latter
method would result in a judgment of $130,000.
Treating the issue as one of first impression, the Flintkote
court interpreted section 4 of the Clayton Act as requiring that the
jury award be trebled. While acknowledging that the plaintiffs
were entitled to only one satisfaction of their claim, the court de-
cided that their claim was equivalent to treble the amount of ac-
tual damages. Accordingly, it held that the settlement should be
deducted from the trebled amount. The Flintkote court offered
three policy arguments in support of its conclusion. First, "[i]n the
case of punitive damages joint tortfeasors are liable for the entire
amount, not merely the compensatory part."1 8 Since the extra
double damages under the antitrust laws clearly are punitive, the
same reasoning should apply.19 Second, a restrictive construction
of the treble damage provision would violate the clear intent of
1 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
17 246 F.2d at 397. Historically, the release of one joint tortfeasor relieved other joint
tortfeasors of liability. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 49. To avoid this result, an injured
party would covenant not to sue the settlor rather than release him from liability, thereby
preserving the plaintiff's cause of action against the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. Id. § 49, at
303. In antitrust cases, however, the effect of a release depends upon the intention of the
parties. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 342-46 (1971). The
covenant not to sue, therefore, is no longer necessary to preserve the plaintiff's cause of
action against nonsettling antitrust defendants.
18 246 F.2d at 398.
19 Id.
[Vol. 56:1
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Congress in creating the private antitrust action as a means of de-
terring unlawful business practices.20 "Moreover, a contrary result
would put a premium on litigation and discourage settlements. 21
With the exception of Telex Corp. v. IBM,22 subsequent cases sim-
ply have applied the Flintkote rule without subjecting it to critical
scrutiny.23 The Telex court, however, further refined the Flintkote
rationale.
In Telex, the plaintiff accused IBM of monopolizing certain
markets and IBM counterclaimed based upon the alleged misap-
propriation of trade secrets.24 The district court found both claims
to be valid.25 The plaintiff's damages included the amount of sales
which it would have made were it not for the antitrust violation. A
mindless application of Flintkote would have resulted in the treb-
ling of this amount and the subsequent deduction of the amount
which IBM had been awarded on its counterclaim. The Telex court
noted, however, that a portion of the plaintiff's lost sales would
have been attributable to its unlawful use of IBM's trade secrets.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd in part on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
23 In Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal.
1962), the owner of a single movie theatre sued a chain of theatres for restraint and monop-
olization of trade. The court noted that "[a]long with Flintkote ... these cases indicate
that where the law has a punitive purpose in multiplying the compensatory damages, such
as in the antitrust laws... any set offs, or deductions, from the judgment must be made
after the compensatory damages are multiplied... that the punitive purpose of the law
will not be frustrated." Id. at 716. See Hydrolevel Corp. v. ASME, Inc., [1980-81] Trade
Cases (CCH) 63,651 (2d Cir. 1980); Baughman v. Cooper Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 534
(3d Cir. 1976); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Semke v. Enid
Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 445, 447 (W.D. Okla. 1970), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972); Jerard Assocs. v. Stanley Works, [1966] Trade
Cases (CCH) % 71,820 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Indeed, until recently, the Flintkote method had
"survived without serious challenge" and had slippped by "quietly accepted" without ques-
tion. Salzman, supra note 7, at 1594.
24 367 F. Supp. at 267. In 1966, Telex began manufacturing certain plug compatible
peripheral devices for electronic data-processing equipment. These devices were substan-
tially similar to the IBM models, but were priced lower. Id. at 270. Since Telex was acquir-
ing a portion of the IBM market, IBM retaliated in 1970 with a program designed to impede
Telex's growth in this area. Id. at 293-95. Telex accused IBM of five specific acts which
allegedly constituted monopolization of trade. See id. at 267-68. IBM's counterclaim as-
serted that Telex had misappropriated trade secrets by placing former IBM employees who
were capable of developing Telex technology in peripherals on the basis of IBM design in
key positions. Id. at 313, 315-16.
2 Id. at 363-65. The court of appeals upheld IBM's misappropriation counterclaim, but
reversed the lower court's decision on Telex's claim. 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Observing that "damages cannot be recovered for detriment not
based up on the violation of legal rights," the court deducted the
amount of lost sales which would have been obtained through the
misappropriation of plaintiff's trade secrets from the antitrust
damages before trebling them.
2 1
Although the Telex court engaged in a perceptive analysis of
the problem presented, it did not take its rationale far enough.
Had the court done so, it would have rejected the entire Flintkote
rationale. Indeed, a critical examination of the policy arguments
advanced by the Flintkote court reveals that they do not support
its conclusion.
THE FLAWS IN Flintkote
The Theoretical Unity of Joint Tortfeasors
The Flintkote court found significance in the fact that a joint
tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages sustained by
an injured party-both compensatory and punitive. 7 This state-
ment, however, no longer is entirely accurate. Although the cases
almost uniformly hold that compensatory damages may not be
apportioned among joint tortfeasors,28 the courts disagree over
whether there may be an apportionment of punitive damages.2 9
The more recent cases apparently indicate a trend toward allowing
such apportionment on traditional equitable grounds.30
28 367 F. Supp. at 353.
217 246 F.2d at 398; see notes 2 & 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
11 See, e.g., Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 474, 177 N.W. 764, 766 (1920); Oliver
v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 857, 110 So. 666, 668 (1926); Garrett v. Garrett, 228 N.C. 530, 532,
46 S.E.2d 302, 302 (1948). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 52, at 314-15.
29 For cases where punitive damages were held to be apportionable, see Thomson v.
Catalina, 205 Cal. 402, 405-06, 271 P. 198, 200 (1928); Nelson v. Halvorsun, 117 Minn. 255,
260, 135 N.W. 818, 819 (1912); Edquest v. Tripp & Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont. 446, 455, 19
P.2d 637, 640 (1933); Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353, 359 (N.D. 1960); Mc-
Curdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 450, 248 N.W. 512, 520 (1933); Moore v. Duke, 84 Vt. 401,
408, 80 A. 194, 197 (1911). For cases reaching the opposite conclusion, see Bowman v. Lewis,
110 Mont. 435, 440, 102 P.2d 1, 3 (1940), overruled on other grounds, Fauver v. Wilkoske,
123 Mont. 228, 234, 211 P.2d 420, 426 (1949); Leach v. Helm, 114 Or. 405, 415, 235 P. 687,
690 (1925). See generally Note, Apportionment of Punitive Damages, 38 VA. L. Rv. 71
(1952).
30 See Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482, 489-90 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d
511 (3d Cir. 1975); Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 43-44, 344 A.2d 180, 190
(Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353, 359 (N.D. 1960);
Vickrey v. Dunivan, 59 N.M. 90, 94, 279 P.2d 853, 856 (1955); Huckeby v. Spangler, 563
S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tenn. 1978).
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To the extent that the courts permit the apportionment of pu-
nitive damages, the theoretical unity of joint tortfeasors is de-
stroyed. Once that unity has been broken, there is no logical or
historical compulsion to retain the Flintkote rule. Current law does
not prevent one antitrust defendant from settling and thus avoid-
ing the possibility of incurring punitive damage liability at trial. It
also does not mandate that a nonsettling defendant be held ac-
countable for the full amount of punitive damages which might
have been assessed against all of the defendants had they all gone
to trial.3 1 Flintkote, therefore, cannot be justified on this ground.
The Violation of a Clear Congressional Intent
The argument that a restrictive construction of the treble
damage provision would violate the congressional intent also is dis-
putable. While one of the most revolutionary aspects of the Sher-
man Act was the creation of a private right of action producing a
recovery of treble damages,3 2 an examination of the legislative his-
tory of the Act does not indicate how Congress intended the treble
damage provision to operate.3 3 The most significant aspect of the
Act was that it granted an aggrieved plaintiff standing to sue in
federal court. As Senator Sherman explained:
[T]his provision allowing any party to sue is of importance. Why,
sir, I know of one case where a man in good circumstances, a
thrifty, strong, healthy American, was engaged in this kind of
competition. He was met in just the way I have mentioned. If he
had the right to sue this company in the courts of the United
31 See note 30 and accompanying text supra. The treble damage provision in the Clay-
ton Act is punitive in nature.
'2 Section 7 of the Sherman Act originally provided that:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person
or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this
act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. IV
1980)).
Congress had a dual purpose in establishing a private cause of action for antitrust viola-
tions. The "person" who has suffered injury was granted redress. In addition, "the feature of
self-enforcement that had been typical in cases of restraint of trade at common law" was
incorporated into the Act. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 225 (1954); see E.
TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS §§ 3.01-.02 (1965).
11 See note 1 supra.
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States under this section he would have been able to indemnify
himself for the losses that he suffered. I have known of other
cases of the kind. Sometimes the damages would be too slight to
give the courts of the United States jurisdiction.
[U]nder these circumstances, it is important to citizens that
they should have some remedy in a court of general jurisdiction in
the United States to sue for and recover the damages they have
suffered. "
Research does not disclose any discussion of when the courts
were to ascertain the damages to be multiplied. When section 7
of the Sherman Act was replaced by the current damage provi-
sion, 8 the only change related to venue. 7 Despite the somewhat
meager legislative history surrounding the treble damage provision,
one point is clear: Congress never addressed the question of
whether damages should be trebled before or after deducting set-
tlements.3 ' The issue presented, therefore, is whether the abandon-
ment of the Flintkote rule would discourage private plaintiffs from
bringing suits to such an extent that the deterrence provided by
31 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
31 On August 14, 1888, Senator Sherman introduced his first antitrust bill which au-
thorized recovery of twice the amount of damages suffered by any person or corporation
injured as a result of antitrust activities. 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.3, at
142 (1980). The final version of the bill adopted by the Senate on April 1, 1890 provided for
recovery of treble damages. Id. § 4.12, at 201.
3' Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), as amended by Act of Sept. 12, 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-349, § 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1156 (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)).
37 See H.R. 15657, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., 51 CONG. REC. 9414-17, 9466-67 (1914).
'8 Although Congress never addressed the issue as to when damages should be trebled,
it could be argued that since Congress amended the antitrust laws generally after Flintkote,
without reversing the rule of that case, it has adopted that rule. This, however, would be an
erroneous assumption. Although some cases contain loose language indicating that a failure
by Congress to amend a statute after judicial construction is evidence of congressional adop-
tion of that construction, the Supreme Court recently put that view to rest. United States v.
Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 135 (1978). In Board of Commissioners, the Court held
that Congress had adopted the Attorney General's administrative construction of the Voting
Rights Act. Id. at 135. Congress, however, had reenacted the statute twice and manifested
its agreement with the construction. Id. Thus, the Court noted, the proper rule is that when
Congress reenacts a statute and voices approval of its existing construction, it is held to
have adopted that construction. Id. at 134-35. No inference, however, can be drawn from
congressional inaction. See NLRB v. Plasterers' Union, Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 129-30
(1971); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970). Where,
as here, Congress has not amended, enacted or even addressed the basic treble damage pro-
vision and its application to settlements, there simply is no reason to believe that Congress
accepted the Flintkote approach.
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their suits would be eroded. s It is highly unlikely that such a re-
sult would occur. Without Flintkote, should a plaintiff settle
before trial, he will receive the bargained-for estimate of his dam-
ages.'0 If a plaintiff is unable to obtain a global settlement and
must go to trial against some defendants, he still may recover his
attorney's fees and the trebled damages remaining in the case. It is
difficult to imagine how such a package of incentives could prove
insufficient to induce a plaintiff to prosecute a meritorious case. 1
It, however, might lessen the currently irresistible temptation to
bring all such cases to trial."2
Moreover, the argument that a restrictive construction of the
The private action sanctioned by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & 1981
Supp.), has gained increasing importance as an enforcement mechanism. See ABA, ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 254 (1975). In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), the Supreme Court stated "that the purposes
of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-
present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 139. See Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34,
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 574 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1978). Similarly, treble damages
are used to encourage private suits and to effectuate efficient administration of the antitrust
laws by acting as a deterrent against future antitrust violations. E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note
29, § 3.01. Several factors, however, tend to mitigate the deterrent effect of the treble dam-
ages provision. These include, for example, the tax treatment received by a corporate defen-
dant who has been found guilty in a private suit. Unless there was a prior criminal convic-
tion or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on the same set of facts, a corporate defendant is
entitled to deduct the full amount of any settlement or judgment as a business expense.
Even when there has been a criminal conviction, one-third remains deductible. Finally, in-
terest also is excluded from antitrust damage computations. Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-
Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319, 1322-23 (1973). See also Blair,
Antitrust Penalties: Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 57, 61-62; Parker,
Treble Damage Action-A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations? 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 483, 486-501 (1971).
'1 A plaintiff who settles before trial will receive the bargained-for estimate of his dam-
ages reduced by the evaluation of litigation risk. To oversimplify slightly, if a plaintiff has a
claim for $100,000 in actual damages and believes that he has a 70% chance of prevailing at
trial, he will accept approximately $70,000 in settlement. Obviously, this view assumes a
settlement based on single damages, not treble. This actually is the way the vast majority of
antitrust settlements are negotiated. Although it is not possible to cite case law for this
proposition, the author's own experiences leave him with no doubt of its validity. See also
Halper, The Unsettling Problems of Settlement in Antitrust Damage Cases, 32 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 98, 99 (1966) (settlements usually compensate injured party for 50% of ac-
tual damages at one extreme and total actual damages plus litigation costs at other).
41 See text accompanying notes 44-45 infra. Note that the antitrust statute originally
provided double damages, see note 1 supra. By increasing the provision to treble, one could
argue that Congress set an absolute maximum on the incentive it meant to offer. See text
accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
42 See note 10 supra.
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treble damage provision would inhibit congressional intent is defi-
cient because it admits of no limitations. Under this line of reason-
ing, any limitation on a private antitrust plaintiff could be at-
tacked on the ground that it frustrates the prosecution of private
actions. When taken to its logical conclusion, only the per se liabil-
ity of all possible defendants for the maximum amount of damages
would satisfy this argument. Clearly, however, limitations have
been placed on antitrust plaintiffs which do not frustrate the con-
gressional intention to rely on private enforcement.4 s
13 Since it is "not a means of enforcing the law by common informers," the private
action treble damages remedy only is available to those plaintiffs who meet the section 4
standing requirements. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 388 (1960); see Ha-
waii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 (1972). To have standing, a plaintiff must
show an injury to a business or property interest which occurred "by reason of" the anti-
trust violation. Selinger v. A&M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979). In addition to preventing excessive litigation, one purpose of
the standing requirement is to prohibit the "in terrorem use [of the treble recovery provi-
sion] by plaintiffs having speculative claims or seeking windfall recoveries." Laurie Visual
Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 951, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In estab-
lishing the contours of this standing requirement, the courts have found that the treble
damage windfall to the business or property of a corporation will not extend to a stock-
holder who is damaged by the reduction in the value of his stock attributable to the anti-
trust violation. Such damages are considered "indirect" and too tenuous to be sustained.
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910). Consistently, courts have ap-
plied Loeb's "direct injury" standard to deny shareholders standing to sue on their own
behalf. Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J.
809, 815 n.19 (1977); see, e.g., Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). See also E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 32, § 4.04.
The situation of a plaintiff who has been prevented from establishing a new business or
entering an industry presents special standing problems. Some courts have held that such a
plaintiff cannot establish that it has a concrete business or property interest that can be
injured. See, e.g., Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1962). A number
of courts, however, grant standing to a plaintiff who has taken demonstrable steps to under-
take a business or penetrate an industry. The plaintiff must show that it had the "intention
and preparedness to engage in business." Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 166 F. 261, 264
(2d Cir. 1908), aff'd, 213 U.S. 347 (1909)); see Solinger v. A&M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304,
1309-10 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Quinonez v. National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 1976). Furthermore, plaintiffs' efforts to
show standing to sue "are done in a milieu of case law that has not attained high analytical
rigor or predictability. It involves drawing a line somewhere in the cause-effect relationships
of an interdependent economy." K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 69 (footnote omit-
ted). See generally Arnold, Implied Right of Action Under the Antitrust Laws, 21 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 437 (1979); Eiger, Evolving Concepts of Antitrust Inquiry, 61 CHI. B. REC. 54
(1979).
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The Discouragement of Settlements
The third reason for the adoption of the Flintkote rule was
that a contrary result would discourage settlements and foster liti-
gation. The court simply stated this reason without offering an ex-
planation. Deducting the settlement before trebling the damages,
however, apparently would encourage settlements and discourage
continued litigation.
If a plaintiff settled with all of the defendants, he would re-
cover only his compensatory damages." Under the current law, if
there has been a partial settlement, the plaintiff has an enormous
incentive to go to trial for the remainder and reject any further
settlement attempts. For example, assume a plaintiff has sustained
$100,000 in damages and has arranged settlements with some of
the defendants totalling $75,000. If he completes the settlement, he
can obtain another $25,000. Although he presently is at risk for
$25,000, he has an enormous incentive to continue on to trial. If he
wins, he will receive an additional $225,000, his attorney's fees, and
costs. Actually, this amounts to more than treble damages since
the remaining damages are nonupled. Thus, the risk multiplier is a
factor of nine.'5
The repeal of Flintkote would encourage total settlement by
reducing this exorbitant premium for litigation. Under the above
example, the plaintiff has obtained $75,000 through a settlement
and is at risk for the remaining $25,000 in damages. If he were to
win under the proposed rule he would receive an additional
$75,000, attorney's fees and costs. He therefore pockets a total of
$150,000-which more than compensates him for his loss despite
the reduction of the multiplier to a factor of three.46
4 See note 41 supra. The compensatory damages would be reduced by the amount of
the litigation risk.
4" The net multiple is greater than three with respect to smaller settlements. Assume,
for example, that a plaintiff sustains initial damages of $100,000, settles with a defendant
for $25,000 and is at risk for $75,000. If the plaintiff wins, he will receive $100,000 X 3 =
$300,000 - $25,000 = $275,000 which is 3.66 times the amount at risk.
A more subtle question is whether removing Flintkote would limit or discourage the
present practice of settlements based on single damages. Obviously, a plaintiff who sees a
smaller pot of gold at the end of the litigation rainbow may demand more in initial settle-
ments. A defendant, however, who sees his ultimate liability exposure reduced may not be
willing to satisfy the higher demand. This should not present a problem since the trial is
sufficiently unpredictable to make the settlement alternative attractive within a broad range
of dollar amounts. Any limiting effect which the repeal of Flintkote would have on the set-
tlements would be minimal.
46 Whenever the plaintiff wins under the proposed rule, he receives three times the
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CURRENT PROPOSALS SUPPORTING CHANGE
It is the central thesis of this Article that the courts should
temper the windfall aspect of the current doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability under the antitrust laws by deducting the amount of
any settlement from the verdict before trebling the remainder. Re-
cent proposals in the area of contribution for antitrust defendants
also have addressed this issue and would alter the Flintkote rule
by allowing a more equitable deduction of settlements.47 It ap-
pears, however, that these schemes arguably may require legisla-
tive implementation. 48 Elimination of Flintkote, however, need not
await congressional action. The Flintkote rule was a judicial crea-
tion and, as such, can be abandoned by the courts themselves. 49
Nevertheless, an examination of these proposals will serve to illu-
minate the tenuous nature of the policy reasons underlying
Flintkote.
The first proposal is the Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of
1979 introduced by Senator BayhY° This bill would allow contribu-
amount at risk. Suppose, for example, the plaintiff sustains initial damages of $100,000,
settles with one defendant for $25,000 and is at risk for the remaining $75,000. Should he
prevail at trial, the plaintiff would receive treble the amount at risk or $225,000.
47 See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
" The decision in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981),
see note 4 supra, apparently precludes the adoption of alternative contribution proposals
because they would require some allocation of fault. See notes 50-56 infra. In Texas Indus-
tries, the Court stated:
Dividing or apportioning damages among a cluster of co-conspirators presents dif-
ficult issues, for the participation of each in the conspiracy may have varied ...
Some amici and commentators have suggested that the total amount of the plain-
tiff's claim should be reduced by the amount of any settlement with any one co-
conspirator; others strongly disagree. Similarly, vigorous arguments can be made
for and against allowing a losing defendant to seek contribution from co-conspira-
tors who settled with the plaintiff before trial. Regardless of the particular rule
adopted for allocating damages or enforcing settlements, the complexity of the
issues involved may result in additional trial and pretrial proceedings, thus adding
new complications to what already is complex litigation.
101 S. Ct. at 2065 (citations omitted).
41 Being "judge-invented," the Flintkote doctrine may be "judge-destroyed." H. ABRA-
HAM, THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 345-46 (4th ed. 1980) (quoting Montgomery v. Stephan, 359
Mich. 33, 49 (1960)). Indeed, the "reconsideration of a prior decision, [often], is absolutely
essential to the even administration of justice." Bookman v. United States, 453 F.2d 1263,
1265 (Ct. C1. 1972). There is no question of the courts' ability to undo a rule they created;
"from the beginning [the Supreme Court has] rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correc-
tion." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940). See generally Douglas, Stare Decisis,
49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949).
50 Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
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tion in antitrust price-fixing suits.51 Section 4I(b) of the bill ex-
pressly departs from the Flintkote doctrine by permitting a reduc-
tion of the plaintiff's claim by the greatest of three possible
amounts-one amount being treble the actual damages attributa-
ble to the market share of the settling party.52 This claim reduc-
tion device would relieve the nonsettling defendants of the liability
attributable to the settlor's sales or purchases of the good or ser-
vice whose price had been fixed."
The American Bar Association (ABA) also has structured a
contribution bill which achieves a similar result through an alter-
native procedure.5 4 Following a settlement, section (f) of the pro-
posed bill permits the plaintiff to reduce his claim by withdrawing
from suit all of the claims based on the acts or omissions of the
settlors. If the plaintiff does not withdraw those claims, the court
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1468]; see SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE EQUAL ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1979, S. REP. No. 96-
428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) reprinted in [1979] 942 ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) Special Supp. 2 (Dec. 6, 1979) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 96-428]. Initially, the
Bayh bill was proposed as an amendment to Senate bill S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REc. 8931 (1979), in May 1979. See Proposed Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979:
Hearings on S. 390 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1979). Subsequently, however, the amend-
ment was withdrawn and reintroduced as a separate bill, S. 1468, in July 1979. See S. REP.
No. 96-428, supra. Although the bill was not enacted, an identical bill was introduced by
Representative Brooks in 1981. See H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 189
(1981).
51 See Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 50, § 41(a), at 123-24. S. 1468 would have al-
lowed contribution solely in actions for price-fixing violations brought under sections 4,
4(A), and 4(C) of the Clayton Act. See Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 50, § 41(e), at 125.
52 Section 4I(b) of S. 1468 provided for a reduction of the plaintiff's claim by the great-
est of (1) any amount stipulated by the release or covenant; (2) the amount of consideration
paid for the release; or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to the settlor's sales or
purchases of the price-fixed goods or services. Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 50, § 41(b),
at 124. Although this provision is not a pure reversal of Flintkote, it definitely evinces an
intention to treat deductions of settlements more equitably than the present judicially cre-
ated rule. The adoption of market-share liability instead of relative fault apparently was
done to lessen judicial burdens. See S. REP. No. 96-428, supra note 50, at 1-2, 22 n.7. The
set-off procedure, however, has been characterized as requiring some determination of fault,
see Ponsoldt & Terry, supra note 4, at 335-36, or at a minimum, an examination of the
causal factors of relative sales or purchases by each violator. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at
415. Arguably, therefore, the proposal requires legislative implementation.
13 Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 50, § 41(b)(3), at 124. The Bayh proposal also in-
cluded an immunity clause whereby settling defendants would be free from contribution
claims. See Hearings on S. 1468, supra note 50, § 41(c).
54 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, RasOLUTIONS AND REPORT
ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE CLAYTON ACT TO PERMIT CONTRIBUTION IN DAMAGES Ac-
TIONS BROUGHT THEREUNDER (Aug. 17, 1979), reprinted in [1979] 936 ANTITRusT & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-2 to E-3 (Oct. 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROPOSAL].
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would reduce any judgment for plaintiff by the amount which the
settling defendants would have been liable for in contribution had
there been no settlement.5  The ABA proposal deviates from
Flintkote in allowing the plaintiff to withdraw from the case all
claims based on the acts or omissions of the settling defendant.
Thus, in effect, the relative culpability of the settlor would be mea-
sured and the damages attributable to him deducted before the
verdict and consequent trebling of the remaining damages. Addi-
tionally, the bill employs a variation of the Bayh technique but
reaches the same result. It reduces the plaintiff's net recovery by
the amount of the settlor's hypothetical contribution liability after
judgment. The settling defendant's liability for contribution, how-
ever, would be determined after trebling the amount of the plain-
tiff's recovery. Consequently, the plaintiff would obtain a judgment
for the entire amount which would be trebled before deducting the
trebled damages applicable to the settling defendant. Both Senator
Bayh's bill and the ABA proposals, therefore, expressly repudiate
the result reached thirough an application of the Flintkote rule.5 6
An evaluation of the various contribution proposals is beyond
55 Section (f) of the ABA PROPOSAL provides:
Following a settlement in the action in respect of which contribution rights
are claimed with less than all defendants, the plaintiff may, within sixty (60) days
of the settlement, elect to withdraw from the damage action all claims based upon
the acts or omissions of the settling person or persons. Failing such an election by
plaintiff, the court shall reduce any judgment by the amount for which each set-
tling defendant would have been liable for contribution had there been no
settlement.
ABA PROPOSAL, supra note 54, § (f), at E-3.
56 S. 1468 differs in several major respects from the ABA proposal. First, S. 1468 limits
contribution to horizontal price-fixing cases. S. REP. No. 96-428, supra note 50, at 3. The
ABA proposal, on the other hand, would establish a basic right to contribution in all anti-
trust damage actions where one party may be held liable for the wrongful conduct of an-
other. ABA PROPOSAL, supra note 54, at E-3. Second, S. 1468 would allow a claim for contri-
bution against any participant in an agreement to fix, maintain or stabilize prices, S. REP.
No. 96-428, supra note 50, at 3, while the ABA proposal would limit the number of possible
defendants to only those persons named in the plaintiff's complaint, see ABA PROPOSAL,
supra note 54, at E-3. Third, S. 1468 permits a contribution claim by a settling defendant
who has paid more than his allocated share to the plaintiff against a nonsettling defendant,
S. REP. No. 96-428, supra note 50, at 3, while the ABA proposal would prohibit such a
claim, see ABA PROPOSAL, supra note 54, at E-3. Finally, the ABA proposal provides a stat-
ute of limitations for contribution claims. Specifically, claims are barred unless they are filed
within 1 year of the service date of the original complaint or within 60 days after the claim-
ant for contribution receives reasonable notice of his liability or potential liability. ABA
PROPOSAL, supra note 51, at E-3. S. 1468 contains no such statute of limitations. S. RaP. No.
96-428, supra note 50, at 3-4.
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the scope of this Article. Significantly, however, both proposals
entail an abandonment of the Flintkote rationale.58 This strongly
suggests that the policy reasons underlying the rule have been
undermined, if indeed they were valid in the first instance.
ARGUMENTS FAVORING CHANGE
When advocating a particular construction of a federal statute,
the touchstone obviously is the congressional intent.59 Yet, Con-
gress apparently never focused on the problem of deducting settle-
ment amounts from treble damage awards."0 It undoubtedly in-
cluded the multiple damages provision to encourage private suits,
but there is absolutely nothing in the legislative history which sug-
gests that Congress "meant" to impose ninefold damages or more
when some defendants settled prior to the judgment. 1 Since the
current law does just that, it arguably is not effectuating the intent
of Congress. Changing the Flintkote rule, therefore, would not
frustrate the congressional purpose in enacting the treble damage
provision.
Moreover, it is a settled rule of law that there can be but one
recovery for any element of damage.62 Indeed, in discussing the ef-
, Although it is not the purpose of this Article to evaluate the various contribution
proposals, it should be noted that both S. 1468 and the ABA proposal may provide more
equitable methods of deducting settlements in antitrust actions. Both proposals, however,
may not be viable alternatives unless legislatively implemented.
58 Because both proposals would move beyond the Flintkote rule by ascertaining the
damages caused by the settlor, neither S. 1468 nor the ABA proposal is a pure reversal of
Flintkote.
09 Statutory interpretation must serve the legislative purpose. AFL-CIO v. Marshall,
570 F.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "[Elven the most basic general principles of statutory
construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent." National R.R. Pas-
senger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (citation omit-
ted); accord, Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Sampson, 591 F.2d 944, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Taray v. Moldovanyi, 478 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); UPS v.
United States Postal Serv., 455 F. Supp. 857, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 604 F.2d 1370 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2929 (1980); see Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83,
88 (1940); cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 23-24
(1979) (implication of private right of action turns on congressional intent); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) (central inquiry is congressional intent).
80 See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra. Neither the Sherman Act nor Clayton Act
addresses the problems raised by the issue of liability among multiple antitrust coconspira-
tors. For a detailed summary of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see 1 E. KiNT-
NER, supra note 35, §§ 4.1-.18 (1980).
8" See text accompanying note 45 supra.
62 A "cardinal" principle of law is that "[w]here there has been only one injury, the law
confers only one recovery, irrespective of the multiplicity of parties whom or theories which
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fect of a purported release of an antitrust violator, the Supreme
Court has noted that, "entirely apart from any release, a plaintiff
who has recovered any item of damage from one coconspirator may
not again recover the same item from another conspirator; the law,
that is, does not permit a plaintiff to recover double payment.""3
When this observation is juxtaposed with the statement in Telex
that a plaintiff recovers treble damages only for a violation of his
legal rights,64 it becomes clear that the problem posed in Flintkote
necessitates an inquiry into the theoretical underpinnings of legal
rights.
Normally, the right to damages is coextensive with liability for
those damages. The legal right to damages is extinguished by a set-
tlement because the settlement also extinguishes liability for those
damages. Obviously, this is true when the entire case has been set-
tled and it is equally true when there has been only a partial set-
tlement.6 5 Accordingly, the applicable rule should be that a plain-
tiff who recovers $75,000 in settlement of a $100,000 claim thereby
extinguishes his right to demand that $75,000 at trial. Since there
remains only a $25,000 claim only that amount should be trebled
after trial. Implicit, however, in the Flintkote rule is the assump-
tion that the right to damages subsists even after the liability for
those damages has been removed. 6 Under this approach, the
the plaintiff pursues." Kassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(footnote omitted). See also Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp.,
453 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1972); Snowden v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 454 F.2d 1047, 1048
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 17 (1865).
3 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971) (citations
omitted).
64 See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 353 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); text accom-
panying notes 24-26 supra.
65 See text accompanying note 64 supra. Both the Bayh and ABA bills, supra notes 50-
56, recognize that a partial settlement will extinguish the right to damages.
66 The subsisting damages theory should not be confused with the situation where a
claim subsists, but is unenforceable. The most obvious case is a claim against someone not
subject to personal jurisdiction. Although a judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is
valid and final as to that issue, the plaintiff's substantive claim subsists, that is, the judg-
ment does not actually extinguish plaintiff's right to bring an action on the same claim.
Segal v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1979); see Weston Funding
Corp. v. Lafayette Towers, Inc., 550 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g 410 F. Supp. 980
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); 1B J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.405[5] (2d ed. 1980). Similarly, if a
contract claim is held to be barred by the statute of limitations, a new promise to pay the
contractual obligation will be held enforceable because the underlying claim has never been
extinguished by payment. 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 2047-2054 (3d ed. 1978); see, e.g.,
Nyhus v. Travel Mgmt. Corp., 466 F.2d 440, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[a] conventional statute
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plaintiff retains his "right" to the entire $100,000 in damages de-
spite having already received three-fourths of that amount.
Generally, the adoption of either view is of no moment since a
plaintiff cannot collect actual damages from more than one defen-
dant. In antitrust litigation, however, where the damages are treb-
led, the distinction becomes crucial. Although the plaintiff cannot
collect the $75,000 again as actual damages under the subsisting
damages theory, his right to those damages is retained through
judgment. The settlement deduction only takes place at the time
of collection. This is the theory of legal rights under which the full
$100,000 is trebled before deducting the settlement. It unnecessa-
rily allows the recovery of an amount equal to twice the previously
paid claims. Such an approach is bad law and bad policy.
Clearly, courts will not wish to delve into theories of rights
and liabilities without some method of applying them in a particu-
lar instance. In this case, however, the application is relatively sim-
ple. The key is the interpretation of the clause "shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained."6 The problem arises be-
cause there is no statutory provision governing the time when the
damages are to be computed. Because trebling takes place at the
time the judgment is returned,6 the phrase "damages by him sus-
of limitations operates upon remedies and not substantive rights; its running extinguishes,
not the obligor's obligation, but rather the obligee's power to enforce it.") (footnotes omit-
ted); Hayden v. International Banking Corp., 41 F.2d 107, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (new promise
acknowledges subsisting personal obligation to pay). Payment of the damages would destroy
or extinguish the claim or right. Under the current Flintkote rule, however, the effect is that
payment by the settling party discharges the claim against the settling party, but fails to
extinguish the right to damages. But cf. Teledyne Mid-America Corp. v. HOH Corp., 486
F.2d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1973) (payment as full satisfaction of larger debt as accord and
satisfaction discharges original obligation).
The Flintkote rule defies the general legal theory underlying the concept of settlement,
whereby a settlement both discharges the claim and destroys the legal right to damages. See
Protective Closures Co. v. Clover Indus., Inc., 394 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1968); Cia Anon
Venezolana De Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1967) (settlement is as con-
clusive of parties' rights as judgment would be if it had been litigated); Swift Chem. Co. v.
Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1343, 1356 (E.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 1121 (5th
Cir. 1981) ("[s]ettlements generally are viewed as binding, final, and as conclusive of rights
as a judgment" (citation omitted)). See also Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222, 225
(1885) (valid settlement extinguishes cause of action).
67 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1976 & 1981 Supp.).
"' The jury has no discretion in interpreting the treble damage clause in antitrust suits.
Indeed, the jury should not be informed of the trebling provision. See, e.g., Heatransfer
Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 989 n.21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087
(1977); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 852 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
934 (1976); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
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tained" should be read as referring to damages remaining after the
deduction of any settlement. These are the only damages for which
the plaintiff remains uncompensated at the time of judgment.
These are the damages in suit and these are the damages which
should be trebled.
On this reading, the hypothetical intent of Congress is to allow
the threat of treble damages to function as the primary deterrent
of illegal conduct while also serving as a strong motivation to settle
cases before trial.6 9 It also avoids imputing to Congress an inten-
tion to allow more than treble damages based on the possible coin-
cidence of settlements. Even though the guilty defendant in an
antitrust case is a wrongdoer, this does not obviate the need for
fairness. 70 Congress set the punishment at treble damages, but
there is no valid reason to disregard equitable considerations in
prescribing that punishment.
Currently, a defendant which does not settle bears the risk of
liability for huge damages. Ultimately, a defendant may be held
liable for treble the actual damages remaining in the case and
double the damages already paid by all other defendants. The sec-
ond segment of this liability is what is at issue here. Assuming ar-
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 666-67 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361,
1370 (10th Cir. 1972); Sablosky v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929, 941-42
(E.D. Pa. 1955); Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4, 11
(D.D.C. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822
(1957). But see Bordonaro Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 203 F.2d 676, 678-79
(2d Cir. 1953); Cape Cod Food Prod. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 911 (D.
Mass. 1954).
11 See note 8 supra. Regarding the effectiveness of treble damages, one commentator
has stated:
Notwithstanding a great increase in the number of successful treble damage
suits, it would be extravagant to say that the antitrust laws have become self-
enforcing or that businesses are piously policing each other. Rather, in the great
majority of [the then] recent successful cases, the federal policeman already has
arrived and taken the culprit away, leaving the treble damage plaintiff with a
ready-made case. And although it is possible that the publicity given to successful
treble damage suits may itself have frightened a wayward few into good behavior,
the chances are that their chief deterrent effect has been to encourage consent
decrees by discouraging defendants in a Government action from litigation to a
final judgment.
Doyle, Treble Damages and Counsel Fees, in SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AmERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 549-50 (1958).
70 "[T]he plaintiff-oriented, discriminatory effects of the current settlement rule" are
clear. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 422; see Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468, 470 (3d Cir.
1967); Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1979] 937 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-30, A-31 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
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guendo that treble the actual damages remaining in the case is an
appropriate penalty devised by Congress, the additional liabil-
ity-double the damages already paid by all others-amounts to a
penalty for proceeding to trial. This penalty is divorced from the
initial conduct which gave rise to the suit and its amount bears no
relationship to the wrong committed. There is no justification for
the imposition of such a wanton and basically unfair penalty.
Finally, the current rule promotes the inefficient use of judi-
cial resources. In light of the crisis of calendar congestion con-
fronting our courts, it behooves us to promote methods of civil dis-
pute resolution which minimize the strain on our judicial
resources. 71 In addition to the strong social policy favoring the
compromise of disputes, the economic argument also is a factor of
long standing. 2 By enabling the plaintiff to recover nine times the
actual damages for which he is at risk, however, Flintkote provides
the plaintiff with an enormous incentive to force the case to trial
against at least one defendant. While we can maintain confidently
that Congress intended to encourage private suits, it is absurd to
say that Congress wanted to discourage pretrial settlement of those
suits.
CONCLUSION
The abandonment of Flintkote would preserve a plaintiff's in-
centive to sue while reducing his incentive to progress to trial.
Moreover, it would eliminate those factors prompting defendants
to enter into inequitable settlement agreements in order to avoid
monumental treble damage liability. Indeed, no justification exists
to further encourage plaintiffs to proceed to trial by supplying a
pot of gold which Congress never intended to place there.
Flintkote's creation of that pot was unwise, unfair, and unneces-
sary to effectuate congressional intent. Enunciated by one court in
1957, the Flintkote rule should be discarded by the courts today.
"1 See Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
611-12, 625 (1981); note 10 supra.
72 The economy of judicial resources is not only one of the keystones of modem proce-
dural philosophy, it is an issue of particular urgency in the antitrust field. "The monstrous,
indeed grotesque, proportions of the modem antitrust suit are difficult to convey to the
uninitiated.... The ordinary antitrust case is unmanageable... being in the nature of [a]
malignant [growth] on the judicial system." R. POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PER-
SPECTrvE 232 (1976). Use of the judicial system is an external cost of resolving the dispute
which full settlements lessen or eliminate.
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